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Abstract Much work has been done on visual discrimina-
tion in primates over the past decade. In contrast, very little
is known about the relevance of non-visual information in
discrimination learning. We investigated weight and achro-
matic color (color, henceforth) discrimination in bonobos,
gorillas and orangutans, using the exchange paradigm in
which subjects have to give objects to the experimenter in
order to receive a reward. Unlike previous studies, subjects
were not trained to lift objects because lifting the objects
was an integral part of the exchange procedure. This meth-
odology also allowed us a direct comparison between
visual and weight discrimination. We presented 12 subjects
(5 bonobos, 2 gorillas and 5 orangutans) with two sets of
objects corresponding to two conditions. The objects in the
color condition (white/black) diVered only in color and
those in the weight condition (light/heavy) diVered only in
weight. Five apes learned to discriminate weight and six to
discriminate color. Subjects learned color discrimination
faster than weight discrimination. Our results suggest that
bonobos and orangutans are sensitive to diVerences in
weight and able to learn discriminating objects that diVer in
this property.
Keywords Discrimination learning · Kinesthetic 
perception · Weight discrimination
Introduction
Foraging eYciently depends to a great extent on the ability
to acquire and process information about environmental
stimuli. The senses are a main way to acquire this informa-
tion to make eYcient foraging decisions (Gibson 1966,
1979; Gibson KR 1986). Moreover, repeated exposure to
the same stimuli and their consequences foster learning,
which in turn, increase the probability of making optimal
foraging decisions.
Primates have traditionally been considered to be pri-
marily visually oriented animals (Fobes and King 1982),
relying on their highly developed visual system to optimize
their foraging eYciency and avoid toxic substances. How-
ever, the olfactory, auditory and proprioceptory senses also
play an important role in acquiring relevant information for
food selection (Dominy et al. 2001). This seems particu-
larly important considering that a variety of plants and
fruits change color or other visual features only a little if at
all, during ripening or maturation (Nagy et al. 1980; Gau-
tier-Hion et al. 1985). In fact, in some primate species
vision plays only a secondary role in food acquisition. For
example, the aye–aye Wnger taps wood with its Wnger to
produce auditory information in order to locate cavities
under the surface (Erickson 1991). Wild-tufted capuchin
monkeys locate frogs hiding inside the guadue plant by lis-
tening for particular sounds (Izawa 1978). Nut-cracking
chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys have to rely on non-
visual cues (smell, weight, sound) in order to assess the
state of a nut, because the protective shell prevents visual
assessment of its contents (for a more detailed description,
see Visalberghi and Néel 2003). As cracking open a nut is a
costly behavior, both in terms of time and energy, it seems
worthwhile to open a nut only when it contains the energy-
rich kernel inside and not when the kernel has dried
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it seems reasonable to assume that primates would use a
variety of sensory modalities to evaluate and learn about
potential food sources.
We know a fair amount about vision as a way to identify
stimuli associated with food. Visual acuity and color per-
ception are well developed in primates (Spence 1934;
Grether 1940a, b; Tigges 1963; Tigges and Tigges 1965;
Davis and Markowitz 1978; Barbiers 1985; Vonk 2003;
Buchanan-Smith 2005).
Furthermore, numerous studies have investigated visual
discrimination learning in primates using cues such as
color, brightness, shape and size (Jarvik 1953; Fobes and
King 1982; Rumbaugh and Pate 1984). Naïve individuals
typically require dozens of trials to associate a particular
object with the presence of a reward, although other studies
show that individuals can detect the presence of novel
objects in their enclosure quite readily (Menzel and Juno
1982). Additionally, most studies investigating problem
solving of various types (e.g., tool use, inferences, comput-
erized tasks) have relied on the use of visual information
(Tomasello and Call 1997; Matsuzawa et al. 2006). Even
those studies that have investigated whether individuals can
make inferences about food location based on the notion of
weight have relied on visual information to present the task
(Hanus and Call 2008).
In contrast to the wealth of knowledge available on the
use of visual information in primates, we know much less
about the use of other sensory modalities. This is especially
true of their kinesthetic abilities, for instance, with regard to
weight discrimination. To the best of our knowledge, there
are only two published studies in this area. McCulloch
(1941) trained Wve chimpanzees to select the heavier of two
boxes. Despite the large weight diVerences (80 vs. 480 g or
80 vs. 640 g), the chimpanzees needed a median of 1,100
trials to master the task. Once the subjects were successful
in their performance, the weight of the heavier box was
decreased. The smallest weight diVerence that the chimpan-
zees were able to discriminate between was 4 g (80 vs.
84 g).
Klüver (1933) also conducted weight discrimination
experiments with monkeys. Subjects were presented with
two boxes diVering in weight (450 vs. 150 g) and were
required to compare their weights and select the correct
alternative: some subjects needed to select the heavier box
while others were required to select the lighter box. Long-
tailed macaques and spider monkeys took a median of 586
and 330 trials, respectively, to reach an errorless perfor-
mance whereas a capuchin monkey required 321 trials.
Moreover, species varied in the weight diVerence between
quantities that they required in order to see signs of suc-
cessful discrimination (long-tailed macaques: 750 g; spider
monkeys: 900 g; capuchin monkey: 600 g). Thus, these two
studies indicate that subjects of various species are able to
discriminate weight, but it took them hundreds of trials to
reach criterion even though there were considerable weight
diVerences between quantities.
One might conclude, based on this evidence, that visual
discrimination is easier than weight discrimination, thus
reinforcing the idea of a visual-sensory primacy in
monkeys and apes. However, caution is warranted when
comparing experiments on visual and weight discrimina-
tion because they used diVerent methods. Additionally,
only a total of 11 individuals (belonging to 4 diVerent spe-
cies) have been tested on weight discrimination compared
to hundreds of individuals from dozens of species that
have been tested on visual discrimination. It is, therefore,
essential to study the use of non-visual information to get a
more balanced view of discrimination learning with non-
visual stimuli. Such information can be used to design
more complex problem-solving tasks that do not rely
solely on visual input (e.g., Povinelli and Dunphy-Lelii
2001) and to gain some insights about the use of weight to
assess the suitability of stone hammers to crack open nuts
(Boesch and Boesch 1983; Visalberghi et al. 2007; Schrauf
et al. 2008).
The aim of the current study was to evaluate how great
apes, other than chimpanzees, perform in a weight discrim-
ination task. To date nothing is known about the ability of
gorillas, orangutans and bonobos to use weight informa-
tion. For this purpose, we employed a method in which,
unlike previous studies (Klüver 1933; McCulloch 1941;
Schrauf et al. 2008), subjects lifted the objects spontane-
ously, without the need to oVer an incentive to do so. Fur-
thermore, the methodology used here allowed us to directly
compare visual discrimination in the form of an achromatic
color (color, henceforth) discrimination task. This means
that we were able to assess the putative superiority of visual
over kinesthetic information. Additionally, the inclusion of
this visual discrimination task served as a control for the
procedure because we expected that subjects would be able
to solve at least the color discrimination task within the
allocated number of trials.
Method
Subjects
Five orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus abelii), three gorillas
(Gorilla gorilla gorilla) and Wve bonobos (Pan paniscus)
housed at the Wolfgang Köhler Primate Research Centre,
Leipzig Zoo (Germany) participated in this study. There
were 8 females and 4 males with ages ranging from 11 to
33 years (for a more detailed description, please refer to
Table 1). All subjects lived in social groups of various sizes123
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subjects had participated in a number of cognitive experi-
ments including visual discrimination of shape, size, and
color (e.g., Vlamings et al. 2006) but had never been tested
on weight discrimination. The selection of subjects was
based on their preexisting experience in exchanging objects
for rewards with a human experimenter (see Pelé et al.
2009), which represented an integral part of our current
procedure. During the experiment, the subjects were sepa-
rated from their group members and individually tested in
their indoor cages.
Materials
Subjects were presented with two sets of objects. For the
weight discrimination condition, we used 12 grey PVC cyl-
inders (9.5 cm £ 4 cm) of identical outward appearance.
Six of the cylinders were Wlled with lead shot, weighing a
total of 400 g. The other remaining six were empty, and
each weighed 100 g. A transparent silicone paste was added
to incorporate the contents in a solid and homogenous
mass, preventing any rattling noise during manipulations
and evenly distributing the weight throughout the tool. For
the color condition, we presented 12 colored PVC rectan-
gles (8 cm £ 3.5 cm £ 1.5 cm). Six of the rectangles were
black and the remaining six were white. The objects were
placed inside the subjects’ cage in alternate order (see
Fig. 1). A blue and a white bowl were placed in front of the
cage on the ground. We used grapes as rewards for all the
subjects except Bimbo, a male orangutan, who received
monkey chow instead.
Procedure
The experiment was conducted within the framework of the
exchange paradigm (Hyatt and Hopkins 1998) in which
subjects had to exchange objects with a human experi-
menter. In our study, the apes had to return objects with a
certain feature to the experimenter to obtain a food reward.
The advantage of the exchange paradigm was that the act
which was needed in order to assess the critical property
(lifting the object) was a part of the procedure. In particular,
giving the experimenter the objects that were placed inside
the subjects’ cage necessarily involved lifting them prior to
the exchange. Thus neither an incentive nor training was
needed for the subjects to lift the objects in order to per-
ceive kinesthetic cues.
Before the apes entered the testing room the objects were
positioned inside the subjects’ cage on a ledge by one of the
research panels (see Fig. 1). The experimenter was sitting
outside the cage facing the subject. To exclude inadvertent
cueing while the subject was selecting the objects, an
opaque panel prevented the experimenter from seeing the
subjects. Only after the subject had handed the selected
item to the experimenter, and thus had already made its
choice, the experimenter could see or feel if it was the cor-
rect one. This means that apes could not receive experi-
menter-given cues regarding the objects’ value. Below the
opaque panel, a wire mesh divider allowed the exchange of
objects for rewards between the experimenter and the sub-
ject. The experimenter requested an item by extending her
hand, palm-up (begging gesture), in front of the wire mesh.
If the subject returned a correct item, the experimenter
Table 1 Participants of the exchange experiment
Numbers in bold indicate successful performance. Correct: type of correct stimulus, session: session number in which the criterion (6 out of 6 cor-
rect choices) was reached. Order: order in which the two tests were performed (b-w: subjects were Wrst tested for color and thereafter for weight,
w-b: vice versa)
Species Subject Sex Age Color condition Weight condition Order
Correct Session Correct Session
Orang Padana Female 8 White 36 Light 30 b-w
Orang Pini Female 18 Black 36 Light 32 b-w
Orang Dokana Female 17 Black 14 Heavy 36 b-w
Orang Dunja Female 33 White 36 Heavy 36 w-b
Orang Bimbo Male 26 White 36 Light 36 w-b
Bonobo Joey Male 23 Black 29 Heavy 36 b-w
Bonobo Limbuko Male 10 Black 6 Light 14 w-b
Bonobo Kuno Male 9 White 3 Light 9 w-b
Bonobo Ulindi Female 12 White 4 Heavy 35 b-w
Bonobo Yasa Female 9 Black 36 Heavy 36 w-b
Gorilla Bebe Female 26 Black 7 Heavy 36 w-b
Gorilla Viringika Female 11 Black 36 Heavy 36 b-w123
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to the subject. If the subject returned an incorrect object the
experimenter dropped it in the blue bowl on her left and
gave no reward.
Subjects were presented with two sets of objects corre-
sponding to two conditions. In the color condition (white/
black) the items diVered only in achromatic color; in the
weight condition (heavy/light) they diVered only in weight.
Prior to testing, we decided which feature (black or white;
heavy or light) would be regarded to be correct for each sub-
ject. This selection was done arbitrarily, e.g., there was no
obvious reason for the apes why black or white (heavy or
light) should be correct and counterbalanced across subjects.
Each subject received two sessions per day. A session
lasted until all six correct objects had been returned to the
experimenter. Everyday after the Wrst session, the ape was
moved to an adjacent cage to allow the experimenter to
reposition the objects for the following session. Subjects
were tested until they either reached the criterion for error-
less performance (see below) or had received 36 sessions.
Fig. 1 Experimental set-up for 
the exchange experiment: 
exchange objects are placed on a 
ledge inside the ape’s cage. The 
experimenter shows a reward 
that will be given to the subject 
after it has returned a correct 
object. a Ape lifts an object. 
b Ape gives an object to the 
experimenter. Drawing by 
Sandra Michaelis123
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We videotaped all the trials and scored them live on a check
sheet. We used the videotapes to verify the original scoring.
We coded the identity of the objects returned by the sub-
jects. The criterion for successful performance consisted of
returning all six correct objects in their Wrst six attempts
during a given session (errorless performance). As the
probability for such a result to occur when the objects are
returned randomly is 0.001 for a single session and the
combined probability for the whole test of 36 sessions is
0.039, we considered this criterion as suYcient.
We used non-parametric statistics to analyze the data. In
particular, we compared the number of subjects that solved
each task (sign test) and the number of sessions needed to
discriminate color and weight (Wilcoxon test). Additionally
we assessed the eVect of the order of task presentation and
the type of stimuli on performance (Fisher’s test). Finally,
we tested whether bonobos and orangutans diVered in
weight and color discrimination (Mann–Whitney U test).
Gorillas were not included in the species comparison
because of our small (N = 2) sample size. All tests were two
tailed.
Results
Five of the 12 subjects tested performed above chance in
the weight discrimination condition (see Table 1). They
needed a median of 30 sessions (331 exchanges) to reach
the criterion of 6 out of 6 correct exchanges. Six of the 12
apes solved the color discrimination with a median of 6.5
sessions (64 exchanges). The remaining subjects showed no
improvement in performance until the end of the experi-
ment (session 36). Only three subjects learned to discrimi-
nate both color and weight. A comparison of the number of
subjects that solved color versus weight revealed no signiW-
cant diVerence using the sign test (N = 3; P > 0.99). How-
ever, when all subjects were taken together as a group they
seemed faster at discriminating color than weight (Wilco-
xon test Z = ¡2.033; N = 12; P < 0.042).
Subjects learned the color discrimination in both cases—
when white or black was the positive stimulus. Likewise
weight discrimination was also learned on both instances
independently if heavy or light was regarded to be correct.
Neither the type of positive stimulus nor the order of pre-
sentation of conditions had a signiWcant inXuence on the
subjects’ performance in either the color discrimination
task (Fisher exact tests: type, P > 0.99; order, P > 0.99) or
the weight discrimination task (Fisher exact tests: type,
P = 0.072; order, P > 0.99). There were no signiWcant
diVerences in performance between bonobos and orangu-
tans in either the color (Mann–Whitney U test U = 4;
N = 10; P = 0.058) or weight discrimination conditions
(Mann–Whitney U test U = 9; N = 10; P = 0.435). Because
of the small sample size (N = 2), the gorillas were not
included in the analysis for species diVerences. One gorilla
(Bebe) learned to discriminate color within seven sessions.
However, in the weight discrimination condition she
showed no improvement in performance until the end of the
experiment (36 sessions).
Discussion
Some of our bonobos and orangutans learned to discrimi-
nate between diVerences in weight; however, they learned
color faster than weight discrimination. We found no evi-
dence of signiWcant diVerences between bonobos and
orangutans concerning weight discrimination. None of the
two gorillas learned the weight discrimination task but the
small sample size precluded a direct comparison with the
other species.
It may seem surprising that most of the subjects did not
master the weight or color discrimination task. A lack of
motivation for this outcome seems unlikely because even
unsuccessful subjects continued to return objects at every
opportunity and yet showed neither an increase nor a
decrease in their performance over the course of the experi-
ment. Similarly, a failure to understand the task is also
unlikely because all subjects had been fully trained in the
exchange procedure prior to the current study. Perhaps this
result is not so surprising if one considers that learning to
associate an arbitrary cue such as color or weight with a
reward is not a trivial task for great apes (Call 2006). Naïve
apes may take dozens of trials (if not more) to master a
seemingly easy task such as choosing between two alterna-
tives presented on a platform (Spence 1937; Jarvik 1953;
Rumbaugh and Rice 1962; Davis and Markowitz 1978).
Compared to previous studies, orangutans and bonobos
required a much smaller number of sessions to reach the
weight discrimination criterion than chimpanzees and mon-
keys (Klüver 1933; McCulloch 1941). This diVerence is
also true when comparing the number of exchanges/trials in
both sets of studies (median of 331 exchanges in our study/
median of 1,100 trials in McCulloch’s experiment). A
direct comparison with the monkeys’ performance tested
by Klüver is problematic because the author enlarged the
weight diVerences until the Wrst sign of learning occurred;
however, the monkeys needed a median of 414.5 trials to
reach an errorless performance. One possible explanation
for this diVerence is that the species diVered in their ability
to discriminate weight. Alternatively, diVerences in the
method employed in order to assess weight discrimination
could explain these diVerences. In particular, the exchange
method used in the current study meant that no training was123
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text of the task; thus, the apes’ task consisted of perceiving
and associating the discriminative feature that was associ-
ated with reinforcement. One Wnal explanation has to do
with inter-individual diVerences, which were important in
our study. Such large inter-individual diVerences paired
with small sample sizes could potentially explain some of
the diVerences observed between studies. It is currently
unclear which of these three alternatives is responsible or
may have contributed to a greater degree to the observed
diVerences. Future studies based on the exchange method,
comparing the primate species included in previous studies,
will be needed in order to tease apart these alternatives.
We found some evidence that subjects were faster at dis-
criminating color than weight. Unlike previous studies, this
diVerence cannot be attributed to the use of diVerent meth-
odologies to test each perceptual modality. This would
seem to reinforce the notion of a primacy of visual over
kinesthetic information, at least in the case of bonobos and
orangutans. At this point it is important to note that all of
our apes were naïve to weight experiments but had partici-
pated earlier in experiments involving visual discrimina-
tion. This diVerence might therefore have inXuenced the
subjects’ performance and it remains possible that apes
would have been faster when given experience with weight
before. Therefore, it is conceivable that the putative superi-
ority of visual over kinesthetic cues reXected an eVect of
practice.
A remarkable observation from the experiment should
be mentioned. All subjects that were able to solve the
weight discrimination condition started to divide the
objects according to its weight. In particular, whenever an
incorrect item was chosen (touched with the Wnger or
lifted), the subjects placed it on the ground in front of them.
On one instance, a female orangutan placed all the incorrect
items in front of her on a piece of cardboard that she had
brought with her before entering the testing room. Because
an object’s weight is only perceived by lifting it in this
study, this behavior could have been a strategy to help keep
track of the objects that were not rewarded, thereby allow-
ing them to distinguish those objects more readily from the
others. On the occasions when the subjects had also placed
correct items on the ground, we observed that they would
lift each object oV the ground until the correct item was
found. However, this behavior became less frequent over
time.
Although apes can sort objects into distinct groups if
trained to do so (Premack 1976; Garcha and Ettlinger 1979;
Savage-Rumbaugh 1986; Matsuzawa 1990; Spinozzi 1993;
Tanaka 1995), they rarely do so spontaneously (Tomasello
and Call 1997, but see Hayes and Nissen 1971 for a notable
exception on an enculturated chimpanzee). However, in the
present study the apes—without any speciWc sorting train-
ing or special rearing history—spontaneously separated
items spatially according to weight. It is highly possible
that they did so to keep track of the objects’ identity in the
absence of any discriminative visual cues. This explanation
is further reinforced by a similar Wnding on hammer selec-
tion by a capuchin monkey (Schrauf et al. 2008). This indi-
vidual lifted the potential hammers, which were similar in
outward appearance, and placed the heavier (most eYcient)
one close to him, often holding it with his foot. In contrast,
the lighter tools were placed either back or sideways away
from him. Schrauf et al. (2008) concluded that this advanta-
geous strategy allowed the capuchin monkey to keep track
of the heavy tool. Coming back to the current experiment, it
would be interesting to see whether apes would spontane-
ously make diVerent piles of visually undistinguishable
objects based on their weight while the experimenter was
absent, in anticipation of her returning at a later time. This
would not only show that apes sort objects spontaneously
when the situation requires them to do so but that they
could also plan for the occurrence of future events (e.g., the
arrival of the experimenter)—something that has been
recently reported in the great apes (Mulcahy and Call 2006;
Dufour and Sterck 2008; Osvath and Osvath 2008) and cor-
vids (Raby et al. 2007). This form of planning involving the
execution of a number of actions in preparation for a partic-
ular goal has been described as planning for action. An
analogous situation has been reported in dolphins gathering
multiple weights and placing them at a particular location
in preparation to solve a task (Kuczaj and Walker 2006).
Chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys have also been
observed to bring nuts and tools to an anvil to crack open
the nuts (Boesch and Boesch 1984; Visalberghi et al.
2007).
Perhaps one of the most important contributions of this
study is that it calls attention to the use of kinesthetic infor-
mation in testing cognition in primates and other animals.
This is important because most studies have relied on tasks
with a predominant visual component and less attention has
been given to non-visual modalities when presenting prob-
lems. This is even more remarkable given the reported
observations on nut cracking in chimpanzees and capuchins
who use weight as a key feature for the selection of
hammers to crack open nuts (Boesch and Boesch 1983;
Visalberghi et al. 2007; Schrauf et al. 2008). Bril et al. (2008)
reported that captive chimpanzees changed their nut-crack-
ing behavior according to the weight of the hammers pro-
vided to them. Similarly, Biro et al. (2006) found that wild
chimpanzees choice to use a stone as an anvil or a hammer
was aVected by its weight. Our study has shown that utiliz-
ing weight information is readily done by bonobos and
orangutans, and that is picked up much faster than it has
been shown in previous studies. This is the prerequisite for
other tasks such as hammer selection in which weight is a123
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between the relation between weight and reward delivery in
discrimination tasks (like the current one) and the hammer
selection tasks (Call 2006). In discrimination tasks, weight
and reward hold an arbitrary relation, i.e., there is no reason
(other than the experimenter’s choice) why ‘heavy’ should
be associated with reward delivery. In contrast, in hammer
selection tasks, there is a physico-causal reason (having to
do with force) as to why heavy hammers are more eVective
than lighter ones. Detecting weight diVerences between
stimuli is the Wrst step and the prerequisite to presenting
more complex problem-solving tasks based on a richer
causal structure.
The distinction between arbitrary and causal relations
between stimuli is not restricted to weight appreciation
(Hanus and Call 2008) but it extends to other domains
including a naïve appreciation of solidity, gravity, and col-
lision (Call 2004, 2007; Martin-Ordas and Call 2009;
Martin-Ordas et al. 2008; Bania et al. 2009). Most of these
studies are based on visual information but it is conceivable
that future studies will document the arbitrary versus causal
relation in the kinesthetic modality. For instance, one could
investigate whether subjects could infer the presence of a
reward in one of two opaque cups based on its weight. Pro-
vided that both cups are identical and the reward is placed
in one of the cups, the heavier of the two cups should hold
the reward. One would predict that subjects would be much
faster at solving tasks with a causal structure than an arbi-
trary one. Recently, Hanus and Call (2008) showed that
chimpanzees were able to infer the location of a reward
based on the eVect that its weight had on a balance beam.
Nevertheless, in this study the information about the eVect
of weight was visual rather than kinesthetic.
The use of information about weight may not be the only
kinesthetic information that subjects may successfully use
to solve complex problems. Seed (2007) presented Wve
chimpanzees with functional and non-functional trap tubes.
One subject, Alexandra, developed a strategy in which she
inspected both traps of the apparatus with her Wngers before
responding. She started to do so after an incorrect response
and continued this behavior after every error. Interestingly,
Alexandra was the only subject that could solve the task. It
is therefore conceivable that the chimpanzee’s good perfor-
mance was inXuenced by the acquisition of tactile informa-
tion. Thus, although monkeys and apes are primarily visual
animals, other senses (e.g., tactile) also play a major role to
gain relevant information from the environment and can be
a suitable channel to pose some questions about complex
problem solving.
In conclusion, the current study demonstrated that bono-
bos and orangutans were sensitive to diVerences in weight
between two otherwise identical objects. We think that this
kinesthetic ability is of importance as the animals might
apply such knowledge to diVerent situations such as tool use
and tool production or when making inferences about the
physical environment. This study also showed the impor-
tance of the employed method to measure a certain variable.
Whereas in previous studies the chimpanzees needed
approximately 1,000 trials (McCulloch 1941) to reach crite-
rion, the apes in our study learned much faster, although all
of them were naïve to weight experiments. The advantage of
the exchange paradigm was that the act needed to assess the
critical property, namely, lifting the object, was already part
of the exchange routine. Further studies in diVerent contexts
are needed for a better understanding as to what extent apes
can make use of weight information and how this guides
their problem-solving behavior.
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